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Introduction 
The origins of international humanitarian relief can be found in the American-led 
response to the grave and growing crisis affecting European civilians and soldiers in World War 
I.  Immediately after the “guns of August” roared in 1914, American relief programs for Europe 
commenced.  Private American institutions and citizens, called by one leading architect of relief 
a “band of crusaders” unlike the world had ever seen—a predominantly secular, Progressive, 
business-minded cadre—mobilized political and social networks across the world to feed and 
clothe some 80 million Europeans in over twenty countries.  Virtually forgotten today, this 
activity constitutes the largest disaster assistance effort in world history and dwarfs that of the 
global response to the South Asian tsunami of December 2004. 
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Most histories of the First World War ignore the vital humanitarian contributions made 
by American organizations.  Relief, if acknowledged, is typically portrayed as tangential to the 
military cataclysm.  Nevertheless, relief and combat were intertwined parts of wartime policy 
and strategy affecting battlefield operations and tactics, and impacting the lives of soldiers and 
civilians.  Popular metaphors that described relief programs as a “war on starvation” were not 
merely rhetorical flourishes.  In fact, relief and war were often conducted for common purposes 
by the same institutions and individuals, and dependent upon the same organizational methods 
and means.  Logistics, particularly the transshipment of foodstuffs, medicine, clothing, and 
personnel, was but the most visible arena in which humanitarian relief and combat support 
functioned identically: the same rail lines and canals that carried food into Belgium conveyed 
German munitions to the frontlines.  Other important interrelationships such as these existed in 
this total war.  Relief organizations, for example, compelled the respective governments to 
superintend more than just war mobilization proper and to provide massive subventions for the 
aid of beleaguered civilians in occupied territories and those living elsewhere as refugees—as 
such, they advocated a redefinition of the relationship of the individual to the state and advanced 
a modern understanding of human rights. 
The traditional narrative that defines American “involvement” in the Great War as 
predominantly military overlooks the centrality of humanitarian relief.  American involvement in 
the First World War did not begin with the U.S. declaration of war in April 1917, but rather with 
the repatriation of American refugees to the United States beginning in August 1914 and with the 
commencement of relief to Belgium in October 1914. 
The most successful of the wartime relief efforts was orchestrated by the American-led 
Commission for Relief in Belgium and northern France (CRB) between 1914 and 1919.  The 
CRB conducted relief with international approval and systematized worldwide charitable 
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contributions, including those of the Rockefeller Foundation, for these occupied nations.  The 
scope of its work was unprecedented in the number of people to whom it provided relief and the 
multiyear duration over which it distributed aid.  The non-governmental CRB daily fed over 9 
million civilians in German-occupied Belgium and France.  It assumed a quasi-nation-state status 
as it negotiated directly with the governments of neutral and belligerent powers, flew its own flag 
on a fleet of chartered relief vessels, and managed a massive and sustained, multi-billion dollar, 
global logistics effort of extraordinary complexity amid the dangers of war.  One British official 
sardonically suggested that the CRB was “a piratical state organized for benevolence.”  It was 
not alone in its efforts to arrest suffering. 
The Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and the American Red Cross, among dozens of other 
organizations throughout the United States, delivered life-giving aid in the form of food, 
clothing, and medicine to millions of Europeans—noncombatants and combatants alike—in 
practically every war-torn region of the continent.  This work was initiated within days of the 
outbreak of war.  Perhaps because American relief efforts successfully mitigated so many near-
starvation crises and epidemics, they have received almost no coverage in the historical 
literature.  Detailed records kept by the leading organizations and by their officials, however, 
permit scholarly investigation.  This report is based upon research in materials that are housed at 
the Hoover Institution Library and Archive in Stanford, California; the Hoover Presidential 
Library in West Branch, Iowa; the archives of the American Red Cross in Lorton, Virginia and 
College Park, Maryland; and the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) in Sleepy Hollow, New 
York.  It focuses, however, mostly on the materials located at the RAC and the preliminary 
findings of research conducted there in August 2007.  It is especially concerned with the war’s 
outbreak and the response of Americans to the humanitarian crises afflicting Europe. 
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Preliminary Findings 
What little is generally remembered about relief in World War I invariably credits 
Herbert Hoover with the initiation of aid programs for Europe.  The Rockefeller Foundation, 
however, actually mobilized for the purpose of instituting a relief program prior to the formation 
of Hoover’s Commission for Relief in Belgium. After having resolved on 21 October 1914—one 
day prior to the founding of the CRB—“that it was urgently desirable that the [Rockefeller 
Foundation] should avail itself of such opportunities as might be presented for the relief of non-
combatant sufferers from the war in Europe, and especially the inhabitants of Belgium,” the 
foundation’s trustees established a system for the delivery of aid.1  Through its close institutional 
ties with the Foreign Sales Department of the Standard Oil Company the RF was able to quickly 
purchase and deliver several shiploads of food to the hungry Belgians before year’s end—this 
immediate response preceded that of the purpose-formed CRB, which took longer to establish its 
financial and transportation arrangements.  Moreover, the RF distributed aid more widely than 
did the CRB.   The foundation assisted Belgian refugees in Holland and Britain as well as those 
civilians who remained under German control in Belgium and northern France; civilians under 
occupied rule were the singular focus of CRB aid. 
Whereas both organizations—the CRB and RF—deserved credit for their generosity and 
capacity to efficiently implement programs of an unprecedented nature, it is worth stressing that 
myriad questions of policy and diplomacy were raised by their foray into large-scale 
international relief.  Belligerent and neutral governments were confronted by a host of new non-
governmental organizations lobbying on behalf of various European constituencies requiring 
assistance.  Government officials were justifiably uncertain at war’s beginning as to which 
organizations they should authorize to perform relief work and to even financially support.  
                                                 
1 Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report, 1913-14 (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1915), 24. 
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Furthermore, it was by no means predetermined that the CRB, RF, and American Red Cross 
would become the major leaders of relief programs because their own officials were divided over 
such issues as the merits of performing emergency relief versus longer-term reconstruction 
operations and whether to aid civilians or soldiers exclusively.  Complicating their decision-
making processes, these three organizations had to jockey for position with at least sixty other 
relief-type organizations that all claimed the authority and capacity to raise monies and often to 
actually deliver aid inside the war zone.  At war’s beginning, therefore, the trajectory of 
American aid was uncertain at best as aid groups negotiated their positions.   
Not only did organizations vie for the lead role in distributing aid within occupied 
Belgium but they also fought to consolidate control over the arrangements by which donations 
were solicited within the United States.  That autumn the RF allied with the Belgian Relief 
Committee (BRC) of New York because this body of prominent bankers, politicians, and 
socialites seemed to hold the greatest promise for successful domestic fundraising.  Robert de 
Forest of the BRC was greatly distressed, however, by the many groups working at cross-
purposes.  He informed foundation official Starr Murphy in mid-November 1914 that “clearly  . . 
. there is to be competition in relieving Belgium.”2  The two men correctly viewed competition 
in this field as less than desirable and certainly inefficient.  Meanwhile, in London, Herbert 
Hoover held the same view but was intently focused on securing agreements with the 
belligerents before turning his attention to raising monies.    When he did so in late 1914 he 
discovered to his dismay that two organizations, the BRC and the Committee of Mercy, had 
already forged relationships with the RF and the U.S. Department of State.  Robert Lansing, the 
department’s counselor and future secretary, encouraged Americans to send monies either 
directly to the BRC or to the Committee of Mercy.  But Hoover soon outmaneuvered both 
                                                 
2 De Forest to Murphy, 18 Nov. 1914.  Folder 657.  See also Thomas F. Ryan to Hoover, 2 Nov. 1914.  Folder 658.  
RF Box 67, RG 1.1, 100N. 
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groups and obtained the clear endorsement of the Rockefeller Foundation and the State 
Department.3  Thereafter the CRB controlled a monopoly of the domestic fundraising activities 
in the United States for the purposes of Belgian relief and the distribution of aid within Belgium.  
Despite a series of miscommunications and misunderstandings that created some ill feelings 
among their officials, the CRB and RF would establish an effective working relationship for the 
remainder of the war and during its aftermath.  
The RF was initially concerned that publicity given its substantial donations might deter 
giving by other American organizations and individuals who viewed the foundation’s deep 
pockets as sufficient to meet the needs of the beleaguered.   It was greatly satisfied that reports of 
its involvement actually stimulated donations.4  One of the likely reasons why the RF 
announcement accomplished this result was that RF involvement gave people a specific 
conveyance for donations.  Americans now knew of a definitive route by which aid would in fact 
go to Belgium.  Likewise, those in the service-provider industry such as operators of tug boats 
and warehouse facilities eagerly offered in-kind donations to decrease the cost of the 
foundation’s shipment of food to Europe.5  The CRB had also been concerned that Americans 
might be immobilized by the humanitarian catastrophe, and was careful about balancing its 
publicity statements to suggest that the need was great but also that a solution could be found in 
the CRB.  Collectively these concerns shared by the RF and CRB reveal their sensitivity to 
public opinion and their attempts to influence Americans to support their activities. 
Nobody knew when the war would end and practically all statesmen, generals, and relief 
officials believed at first that it would conclude quickly.  This perspective influenced RF policy 
                                                 
3 See for example, Warwick Green to Jerome D. Green, 16 May 1916.  Folder 653.  RF Box 66, RG 1.1, 100N. 
4 Murphy to John D. Rockefeller.  12 Nov. 1914.  Folder 665.  RF Box 67, RG 1.1, 100N; and A. Barton Hepburn to 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 5 Nov. 1914.  Folder 653.  RF Box 66, RG 1.1, 100N. 
5 It appears that a portion of the Rockefeller donations, including some contributions by the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial fund to Near East Relief, were given anonymously. 
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at the outset because the foundation was concerned that if it invested too heavily in short-term 
food aid that it would lack the financial resources to invest more systematically in postwar 
reconstruction.  Contributing to this belief about the war’s impending termination was the 
difficulty (and sometimes impossibility) of obtaining accurate information about the war and its 
effects on the people of Europe.  Modern readers may find it difficult to relate to the relative 
immaturity of communications systems that hampered relief work.  Not only were the belligerent 
governments’ policy decisions inconsistently disseminated and often the source of rumor until 
confirmed at much later dates, but even more problematic was the development of appropriate 
programs to remedy critical food shortages and combat the spread of disease.  In late October 
1914, for example, Jerome D. Greene, secretary of the RF, informed Walter Hines Page, the 
American Ambassador to Britain, “None of us has an opinion as to the scale on which our aid 
should be given.”6  This reflected the challenges of assessing a dynamic wartime environment.  
The rationale behind the foundation’s establishment of a War Relief Commission and the 
deployment of its members to Europe derived in large part because of the RF’s need for 
sufficiently accurate information to make sound decisions about its relief expenditures. 
Relief became a task of epic proportions.  The ever-changing nature and the expanding 
geographic extent of the humanitarian cataclysm proved extraordinarily challenging for the 
“relievers” charged with assisting the beleaguered.  Contingents of Red Cross personnel could be 
found laboring in major cities, remote villages, and near the frontlines.  A wartime headquarters 
for the Rockefeller Foundation was established in Bern and its War Relief Commission (WRC) 
officials routinely crisscrossed the warring nations to investigate conditions and verify the 
effectiveness of the numerous programs funded by the foundation.  Their reports contained 
exceptionally detailed surveys of political, economic, and social conditions in the regions 
                                                 
6 Green to Page, 24 Oct. 1914.  Folder 657.  RF Box 67, RG 1.1, 100N. 
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studied.  The WRC first encouraged RF monies to be spent on noncombatant aid, but found the 
distinction meaningless in places like Serbia where civilians could not be isolated from soldiers, 
and effective disease abatement necessitated treating the entire population.7  American CRB 
personnel were dispersed throughout occupied Belgium and France with headquarters in 
Brussels, Rotterdam, and London.  The United States’ declaration of war in April 1917 shattered 
the patina of neutrality maintained by the CRB, but the belligerents sanctioned continued 
American control once the neutral Dutch and Spanish assumed the titular headship of the 
organization and replaced the Americans behind German lines.  Rockefeller personnel were also 
withdrawn from war zones, whereas the Red Cross continued its operations.  These were but 
some of the many American humanitarians engaged directly in overseas relief for the duration of 
the war and long thereafter.  They were supported by a veritable army of sympathetic 
compatriots in the United States and many other countries. 
Total war, especially its disruptive effects on food supplies and public health, had 
engulfed the entire population of Europe.  Relief agencies were continually forced to adjust their 
policies and practices to acknowledge that the lines between soldier and civilian were utterly 
blurred.  Maintaining these distinctions remained important in certain circumstances, however, to 
conform to agreements made with the belligerents and to uphold the expectations of donors.  In 
the case of occupied Belgium and France it was imperative that the CRB maintained strict 
control of its shipments and that no one except for the intended civilian recipients received these 
supplies.  Those detailed statistics facilitated the numerical tabulation of the humanitarian effort, 
but no clearinghouse amassed precise numbers for all the organizations involved.  The successful 
relief of Belgium and France inspired repeated initiatives for the relief of other countries and 
regions including a Rockefeller Foundation effort to form a Commission for Relief in Poland 
                                                 
7 Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report, 1915 (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1916), 293. 
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(CRP).  A variety of factors prevented the CRP from beginning any systematic relief program 
but that did not mean that moral or military arguments were not persuasively marshalled in its 
behalf.  Each relief initiative involved decisions of the highest political and strategic order.  They 
were always conditional and ever-dependent upon the uneasy agreement of two warring 
coalitions.8  One success did not necessarily beget another. 
 
Tentative Conclusions 
No less than tens of millions of Europeans received food and other forms of life-giving 
assistance through a broad-based, multi-billion dollar aid regime.  These initiatives varied 
markedly in intensity, duration, and location.  The wider ramifications of arresting malnutrition 
in millions of children and eradicating often-debilitating and highly lethal diseases infecting 
millions of formerly able-bodied adults are extremely difficult to quantify.  It certainly appears 
that the extensive and prolonged engagement of American non-governmental and governmental 
relief agencies saved millions of European lives. Americans rallied to aid Belgians and other 
afflicted Europeans long before their nation went to war and continued helping others in need 
long after the conflict ended.  Relief constituted America’s greatest contribution to the resolution 
of the war and the mitigation of its worst attributes.  Through continued exploration of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s historical files, particularly its microfilmed Source Books and War 
Relief Commission records, this study will attempt to reveal how the foundation became one of 
the most important organizations in the relief of Europe and the multifaceted contours of that 
involvement. 
                                                 
8 Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report, 1916 (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1917), 318-23. 
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